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NOTES
PFIZER, INC. v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA: THE
ABILITY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO SUE
UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Antitrust legislation in the United States .was enacted to promote a free market system. 1 In furtherance of this goal, section 4 of
the Clayton Act 2 confers upon persons injured by anticompetitive
practices the right to sue for treble damages. 3 Congress imposed this
harsh penalty on wrongdoers to deter potential violators and to
supply greater enforcement than the government alone could provide. 4 To achieve its purpose, the legislation was made broad in its
terms and coverage. 5 Interpretation, application, and development
of the Sherman6 and Clayton7 Acts were left to the courts. 8 The Acts
have been liberally construed with a greater view towards results
than judicial exception. 9 Recently the Supreme Court utilized these
1. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), the Court stated:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); C. KAYSEN & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 11-20 (1959); Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CoLUM.
L. REV. 377, 381-84 (1965).
2. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1976).
3. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States
. . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained . . . ."Id. § 4.
4. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 10-11 (1965).
5. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Sugar Crystal Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
6. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1976).
7. 15 u.s.c. §§ 12-18 (1976).
8. See A. KALES, CONTRACTS AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE 106f (1918); H.
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 228-29 (1955).
9. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977); FMC
v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217-18, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966); W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440
F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 1964) (remedial statutes should be
liberally construed).
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broad policies in order to allow application of the Clayton Act in
treble damage action suits brought by foreign governments.
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 10 the Court held that
foreign governments can sue for antitrust violations committed
against them. In Pfizer, three foreign governments sued six American pharmaceutical firms alleging that the companies conspired to
monopolize and restrain trade in tetracycline, a broad spectrum
antibiotic. The companies countered by challenging the right of the
foreign governments to sue, contending that sovereigns are not
"persons" under the Clayton Act. In its majority decision 11 the Supreme Court upheld the foreign governments' right to sue. 12
The Court drew upon case law, statutory construction, legislative history, and its interpretation of the purposes behind the antitrust Acts to discern the meaning of "persons" in section 4. The
Pfizer holding arguably stands for the proposition that foreign governments have standing to sue for treble damages whenever they are
injured by anticompetitive practices. Stricter interpretation of
Pfizer gives foreign governments standing under the Clayton Act
only under compelling circumstances. Although the need for compelling circumstances was not directly addressed, the Court stated
that the concern of foreign governments for the health and safety of
their citizenry gave these countries no choice but to deal with the
anticompetitive drug companies. 13 This Note will show that the
Court's opinion should be liberally construed, thereby granting foreign governments the right to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act
whenever they are injured by American anticompetitive practices.
II.

PFIZER, INC. v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

The governments of India, Iran, and the Philippines brought
separate actions against six pharmaceutical manufacturers alleging
that the companies conspired to constrain domestic and foreign
trade in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of broad spectrum
antibiotics, in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 14 For
10. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
11. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion of the Court in which Justices White,
Marshall, and Stevens joined. Chief Justice Burger was joined in his dissent by Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Powell, who also dissented separately. Justice Blackmun took no part
in the decision of the case.
12. 434 U.S . at 308.
13. Id. at 318 n.18.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976) . Each respondent also sued in a parens patriae capacity.
Those claims were dismissed in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 615-20 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976).
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practical purposes these actions were consolidated. 15 As an affirmative defense, the drug companies asserted that foreign governments
were not "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages. The trial
court certified this question for an interlocutory appeal. 16 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
foreign nations are "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages. 17
Its decision was affirmed en bane. 18
In affirming the lower court's decision, 19 the Supreme Court
relied on the statutory construction of section 4 of the Clayton Act,
which states:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court . . . without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 20

The Court's inquiry concerning this section of the Clayton Act centered on the meaning of the word "person." Since there is no legislative history responsive to the definition of "person," the Court examined the broad scope of the antitrust acts. As a result of the Act's
15. Pfizer originated from the "Antibiotic Antitrust Actions," in which a large number
of foreign governments sued the drug companies for anticompetitive activities. See Pfizer,
Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 533-34 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972). These actions
were consolidated in In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
Misc. Order No. 74-31 (D. Minn. 1974) and in In re Coordinated Proceedings in Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Three interlocutory orders arose from
the District Court in Minnesota questioning the ability of foreign governments to sue for
treble damages. They were: In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, Misc. Order No. 74-31 (D. Minn. 1974) (Philippines v. Pfizer, Inc.); Misc. Order
No. 74-37 (D. Minn. 1974) (Iran v. Pfizer, Inc.); In the Coordinated Cases and IndiR, Misc.
Order No. 75-48 (D. Minn. 1974) (India v. Pfizer, Inc.). These orders were reviewed by the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting en bane, 550 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, 97 S. Ct. 1643 (1977), and subsequently upheld the foreign
governments' right to sue, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
16. 550 F.2d at 397 n.2. The interlocutory appeal was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), which states:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of
Appeals may thereupon . . . permit an appeal . . . .
28 u.s.c. § 1292(b) (1970).
17. 550 F.2d at 399.
18. Id. at 400.
19. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
20. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1976).
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remedial purpose, the Court had previously interpreted the law liberally, relying on its purpose, legislative history, and recognized
canons of construction. 21
Upon reviewing these aids of construction, the majority of the
Court in Pfizer stated that foreign nations have a right to sue under
the antitrust laws of the United States. Although legislative history
reveals that the Sherman Act was enacted to protect the American
people, 22 nevertheless, foreign corporations are included within the
meaning of "persons" and are entitled to sue for treble damages. 2:i
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the direct protection of
American citizens was the sole purpose behind the Act. In Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 24 the Supreme Court stated that the purposes
behind section 4 were to deter violators and to compensate victims
for their injuries caused by antitrust illegalities. 25 Granting foreign
governments the right to sue creates an additional deterrent to anticompetitive practices, which ultimately benefits the American consumer.28
Sovereignty is not a basis for denying treble damage recovery.
In United States v. Cooper Corp., 27 the Supreme Court held that the
United States could not maintain a treble damage action under
section 7 of the Sherman Act. 28 The Court distinguished Cooper in
Georgia v. Evans, 29 where a state was allowed to sue for treble damages. Though specific remedies were given to the United States
under the Sherman Act, 30 the states were not afforded any statutory
rights. For example, the United States could press criminal charges
to deter violation of the antitrust Act, but the states' only basis for
recovery was to sue as a "person" under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. 31 Foreign governments were considered to be in an analogous
position to the states, and, therefore, were granted the right to sue
for treble damages. 32
21. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941), quoted in 434 U.S. at 316.
22. See 21 CONG. REC. 2597-2600 (1890).
23. 15 u.s.c. § 12 (1976).
24. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
25. Id. at 746.
26. 434 U.S. at 314.
27. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
28. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
29. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
30. The United States has the power to criminally prosecute antitrust violators under
section 3, to enjoin anticompetitive activity under section 4, and to seize goods in interstate
commerce that are in violation of the Act under section 6. 15 U.S .C. §§ 3, 4, 6 (1976).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
32. 434 U.S. at 318.
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In his dissenting opinion in Pfizer, Chief Justice Burger stated
that neither legislative history nor canons of statutory construction
supported the majority's decision that foreign governments had the
right to sue for treble damages. 33 Additionally, he argued that the
right was not specified in section 4 of the Clayton Act. Congress
could have included foreign nations within the definition of
"person," but they did not consider the question. Chief Justice
Burger was troubled by "[ t]he conversion of this silence in 1890
into an affirmative intent in 1978 . . . ." 34 The dissenting justices
also questioned the analogy between foreign governments and individual American states, and were unwilling to expand the right of
a treble damage remedy without express Congressional approval. 35
III.

THE MEANING OF "PERSONS"

In Pfizer, the Court held that foreign governments are
"persons" within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. The
criteria used to interpret the meaning of "person" had been enumerated in a prior case as: "[t]he purpose, the subject matter, the
context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of
the statute . . . ." 36 These aids for statutory interpretation were
employed by the Pfizer Court in reaching its decision.
A.

Case Law

The Court in Pfizer did not question the long-standing common
law right of foreign governments to participate as parties in United
States courts, 37 nor did it question the position of foreign governments once they are in court. 38 Sovereignty is not a basis for denying
foreign governments access to American courts. 39 Indeed, once a
government submits itself to an American court it must stand in the
same position as a private litigant.'0 The assertion of sovereign im33. Id. at 326.
34. Id. at 324-25.
35. Id. at 329.
36. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941) (footnote omitted).
37. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1964);
The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164, 167 (1870); Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 399 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 571 (1927); Swiss Confederation v. United States, 70 F. Supp.
235, 236 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 517 (1947).
38. See generally Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976); The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1976).
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1976). See Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits of Judicial
Control·-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 441 -43 (1977).
40. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1976) . See
Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976).
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munity does not act to completely shield a foreign government from
liability. Congress has adopted a narrow approach to the doctrine
of sovereignty and has denied foreign governments the use of that
defense when they act in their proprietary capacity. 41 Once a government subjects itself to the jurisdiction of a court, 42 its liability may
be such as to expose it to antitrust claims. 43
Prior to the Clayton Act, foreign governments acting in their
proprietary capacity were able to sue American companies in American courts for unfair competitive practices. 44 In addition, sovereigns
have been able to sue under statutes where their rights were not
specifically defined. 45 Applying these criteria to Pfizer, the absence
of specific enabling language in the Clayton Act did not bar the
governments from relief in view of the proprietary nature of their
actions. 48
The United States, while acting in its commercial capacity, was
denied the right to sue' for treble damages under section 7 of the
Sherman Act.47 However, "any person" is allowed to sue under the
Clayton Act. 48 "Person" is defined in the legislation "to include
corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the
laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories,
the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country." 411 In
41. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1976).
42. Id. §§ 1605, 1607.
43. See w. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 111-14 (2d ed. 1973).
44. See French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903); La Republique Francaise v. Schultz, 94 F. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1899), aff'd, 102 F. 153 (2d Cir. 1900); City
of Carlsbad v. Schultz, 78 F. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1897); City of Carlsbad v. Kut.now, 68 F. 794
(S.D.N.Y.), af{'d, 71 F. 167 (2d Cir. 1895).
45. In Swiss Confederation v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 235 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 815 (1947), the court was asked to decide whether a foreign government could sue in
the Court of Claims. The court stated:
A foreign government might be unwilling to submit itself to the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States, but if it is willing to do so, we can conceive of no
reason why Congress should have intended to prohibit a court established by it from
giving to the foreign government the same redress which would be accorded to any
other litigant.
Id. at 236-37. See California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-86 (1944) (Shipping Act of
1916); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369-70 (1934) (revenue statutes); Ruhl v. Railroad
Retirement Bd., 342 F.2d 662, 664-66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 836 (1965) (Railroad
Retirement Act of 1937).
46. See 434 U.S. at 314.
47. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941). Section 7 of the Sherman Act
was repealed since it was redundant in view of section 4 of the Clayton Act. Act of July 7,
1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283. See S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).
48. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1976).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
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Cooper, 50 the Court held that the United States did not fall within
this definition: "in common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily
construed to exclude it." 51 It was reasoned that if Congress had
intended the United States to be a person it would have specifically
included language to that effect. The Sherman Act contains two
distinct causes of action, one for the individual and one for the
government. 52
Although the United States was denied standing to sue for treble damages, the Court allowed individual states to do so in Evans. 53
Cooper was distinguished as deciding only the rights of the United
States: "It was not held that the word 'person,' abstractly considered, could not include a governmental body. " 54 Specific remedies
were granted to the United States by the Sherman Act. For example, the United States may obtain an injunction, prosecute criminally, and seize those goods in interstate commerce which were in
violation of the Act. 55 Since they were given specific relief, it seemed
illogical to include the United States in provisions of the Act where
they were not mentioned. 56 By these measures, Congress granted the
United States an adequate remedy to deter anticompetitive activity. However, if the states were denied standing to sue they would
be left without any redress. 57 The Court in Evans could find no
reason why Congress would deprive a state purchaser a remedy
which was available to other purchasers. 58
The Pfizer Court found foreign governments to be in an analogous position to the states whenever such governments were victimized by anticompetitive practices within the United States. Both
have as their sole remedy a suit for treble damages. The Pfizer Court
reworded its declaration in Evans, substituting the words "foreign
nations" for "states":
50. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
51. Id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 606, 608.
53. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
54. Id. at 161.
55. 15 u.s.c. §§ 3, 4, 6 (1976).
56. 312 U.S. at 606-07.
57. 316 U.S. at 162.
58. Id. at 162-63. See Cotten v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229 (1850), where the
Court stated: "It would present a strange anomaly indeed, if, having the power to make
contracts and hold property as other persons, natural and artificial, they were not entitled to
the same remedies for their protection." Id. at 231.
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We can perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted
to deprive a [foreign nation], as purchaser of commodities shipped
in [international] commerce, of the civil remedy of treble damages
which is available to other purchasers who suffer through violation
of the Act . . . . Nothing in the Act, its history, or its policy, could
justify so restrictive a construction of the word 'person' in§ 7 . . . .
Such a construction would deny all redress to a [foreign nation],
when mulcted by a violator of the Sherman Law, merely because it
is a [foreign nation]. 59

The dissent did not propose that the analogy between foreign
nations and states entitled both political entities to similar relief
against anticompetitive activities. 60 Different treatment of the two
political units would be supported only if Congress intended different policy considerations toward each. Chief Justice Burger noted
that Congress did not consider whether foreign nations or individual
American states could sue for treble damages. 61 However, denying
American states a remedy would deny surrogate protection of American citizens by the states. Since the primary purpose behind the
Sherman Act was to protect the American consumer, 62 a denial of
state standing would frustrate antitrust policy. Granting foreign
governments the right to sue does not benefit the American consumer directly nor frustrate the law's purpose. Chief Justice Burger
noted additionally that there is an important difference between
states and foreign nations. 63
Foreign nations possess their own effective redress against
American anticompetitive practices. 64 Unhampered by the doctrines
of federalism, foreign governments are free to enforce their own
antitrust laws. Though their own laws are contained by jurisdictional limitations, they still represent a viable remedy not available
to American states. Chief Justice Burger concluded by stressing the
economic differences between individual states and foreign nations.
Foreign nations often engage in anticompetitive activities. It presents a strange anomaly to protect foreign nations from practices in
treble damage remedy within the antitrust Acts was to encourage
cannot act in contravention to federal antitrust policies. 66
59. 434 U.S. at 318, citing 316 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1942).
60. 434 U.S. at 326.
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S . 477, 485-86 n.10 (1977) .
434 U.S. at 327-28.
Id. at 327.
Id.
See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S . 197, 332, 334-47 (1904) . But
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The majority in Pfizer did not directly refute Chief Justice
Burger's dissent. However, the Court stated in a footnote that boycotts and cartels are not "available to a foreign nation faced with
monopolistic control of the supply of medicines needed for the
health and safety of its people." 67 It can be argued that only under
compelling circumstances can foreign governments sue for treble
damages. However such a strict reading of the Pfizer opinion defies
the Court's reasoning in Evans. 68 Foreign governments are in an
analogous position to that of the states. Each state can sue under
its own antitrust laws against anticompetitive practices. 69
In Evans the Court held that states can sue for treble damages
under the Sherman Act. The question of whether an adequate state
remedy existed was not addressed. The Pfizer decision is only consistent with the Evans holding when construed liberally. Although
the Pfizer decision is not clearly supported by case law, a study of
the legislative history of the antitrust acts provides added support
for the Court's holding.

B.

Legislative History

Congress did not consider the rights of foreign governments
when it enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 7°Congress' concern
was domestic-to foster competition within the American market. 71
Although the Court in Pfizer found the legislative history of the acts
inconclusive as to foreign state standing, it was able to use the
legislative background to delineate and explore congressional purpose more precisely. Though protection of an American free market
economy was the purpose behind the antitrust laws, the Court reasoned that this purpose was not dispositive. A definition of
"persons" which included foreign corporations indicated broader
congressional purpose than mere domestic protection. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that there was no legissee Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Parker v . Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (194~~)
(cases where the Court has found certain state actions to be exempt from the federal antitrust
laws). For limitations on this doctrine, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975). See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, 731-39 (1977);
see also Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulations, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. 1469
(1961).
67. 434 U.S. at 318 n.18.
68. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
69. See State Laws, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 30,000 (1977).
70. 434 U.S. at 312; 316 U.S. at 162; 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941).
71. See A. KALES, H. THORELLI, supra note 8.
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lative support for the majority's opinion. If Congress intended foreign governments to sue for treble damages it would have included
nations within the definition of "person." It is not the Court's function to speculate about supposed congressional intent when the
issue in question was admittedly never considered. 72
The legislative environment at the time of the passage of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts sheds little light on congressional intent. 73 In 1871 Congress enacted statutes which defined general
terms, in a sense creating its own dictionary. 74 At first, "person" was
defined to include body politics and corporate beings. 75 Body politics was later deleted from the definition because the word was too
comprehensive. 78 Congress did not believe that governments were
"persons" in the general sense of the word. 77 It is highly questionable
whether this intent was still controlling twenty years later when the
Sherman Act was passed. Today there still exists a general definition of "person. " 78 However, the Supreme Court has never looked to
the general definition to define "person" in the antitrust Acts. 711
Sovereigns have also been allowed to sue under legislation where
"person" is not defined to include body politics. 80 Legislative history
is a tool the courts may use to discern congressional intent. Yet it
is often not persuasive or clear. An examination of the antitrust
72. 434 U.S. at 329.
73. See 550 F.2d 396, 399-400 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
74. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 527,
536 (1947).
75. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74-75.
76. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431-32. See Final Report of The Commission to
Revise and Codify the Laws of the United States 11 (1909).
77. Blackstone defined "person" to include body politics:
Persons also are divided by the law into either natural persons, or artificial. Natural
persons are such as the God of nature formed us, artificial are such as are created
and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government, which are
called corporations or body politic.
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 122 (rev. ed. 1871), quoted in Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 92 (1934).
78. "lTJhe words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies as well as individuals." 1 U.S.C. §
1 (1976).
79. See 434 U.S. at 313; Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942); United States v. Cooper
Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
80. See California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585 (1944) (Shipping Act of 1916); 316
U.S. at 161 (Sherman Act); 203 U.S. at 396; United States v. General Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp.
197, 207 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (Clayton Act). Contra, Greenspan v. Crosbie, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder! FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,780 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (1934 Securities Act). Here,
however, legislative intent is clear.
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statutes and their construction may help define the meaning of
"person."
C.

Statutory Construction

The Pfizer Court stated, "[t]he word 'person' . . . is not a
term of art with a fixed meaning wherever it is used . . . ."Kt Examination of a statute in its entirety is more reliable than overly mechanical or technical approaches. 82
Statutes employing the term "person" will not ordinarily be
construed to include the sovereign. 83 The Court employed this presumption to deny the United States the right to sue for treble damages. 84 This presumption originated in the English common law
immunity of the crown and was adopted by American jurisprudence.85 Cooper relied on United States v. Fox, 88 where the Court, in
defining "person" in a New York State statute, stated:
The term 'person' as here used applies to natural persons, and
also to artificial persons,-bodies politic, deriving their existence
and powers from legislation,-but cannot be so extended to include
within its meaning the Federal government. It would require an
express definition to that effect to give it a sense thus extended. 117

However, this presumption has not always been applied. In Stanley
v. Schwalby, 88 the Court held that the word "person" in a statute
would include the United States as a body politic and corporate
being. 89 In determining whether states or municipalities could sue
under the Sherman Act the presumption raised in Fox was not
controlling. 90
Other rules of statutory construction do not clarify whether the
meaning of "person" should be extended to the sovereign. In United
States v. Wise, 111 the Court stated that statutes should be construed
81. 434 U.S. at 315.
82. Id. at 313.
83. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947); United States v.
Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 321 (1876). But
see Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 517 (1893).
84. 312 U.S. at 604-05.
85. 3 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 62.01 (4th ed. 1974).
86. 94 U.S. 315 (1876).
87. Id. at 321.
88. 147 U.S. 508 (1893).
89. Id. at 517.
90. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161 (1942) (states); Chattanooga Foundry v.
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipalities).
91. 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
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with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of passage. 112
Since a sovereign's right to sue for treble damages was not considered at the time of passage, 93 this rule does not provide assistance.
Another rule that is inconclusive is that a foreign sovereign
should be placed in the same position as a body corporate. 114 Applying this presumption to the antitrust statutes, however, results in
two opposing conclusions. In Pfizer, Justice Stewart found that foreign governments and states were in an analogous position, 115 while
Chief Justice Burger believed that foreign nations should be compared with the United States. 96
A number of statutory rules of construction could preclude sovereign nations from being considered as within the meaning of
"person." One such rule is that the inclusion of the specific will
exclude the unspecified. 117 If one applies this presumption to the
antitrust statutes it would follow that sovereigns should be excluded. However, if one applies a different presumption, the unspecified term-sovereign-may fall within the definition of "person."
In defining "person," the Clayton Act used the word "include." 1111
The term "include" indicates that the listing is descriptive rather
than restrictive. 911 The Pfizer Court relied upon this presumption, 100
which is also consistent with the ruling of the Court in Evans. 1111 If
sovereigns were excluded from the definition of "persons," the states
could not have been granted standing to sue for treble damages.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated that the Court will
not rewrite ambiguous legislation without finding support in the
legislative history. 102 The Court could not follow this presumption
92. Id. at 411.
93. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 396, 399-400 (8th Cir. 1976) (Ross, J.
concurring), aff'd, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
94. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134-35 n.2 (1938).
95. 434 U.S. at 313-14.
96. Id. at 321-22.
97. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
458 (1974); Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929).
98. "The word 'person' or 'persons' wherever used in this Act shall be deemed to include
. . . . " 15 u.s.c. § 12 (1976).
99. Cf. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99-100 (1941); Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1 (1934) (both cases construe tax statutes).
100. "The Sherman and Clayton Acts each provide that the word person 'shall be
deemed to include . .. .'It is apparent that this definition is inclusive rather than exclusive,
and does not by itself imply that a foreign government, any more than a natural person, falls
without its bounds." 434 U.S. at 312 n.9.
101. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
102. 434 U.S. at 325; See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210-11 (1976);
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. at 606.
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without disaffirming its holding in Evans. In 1914, prior to the
Evans case, Congress specifically rejected an amendment authorizing state attorney generals the right to enforce the antitrust statutes.103 Denying individual states the same rights as those possessed
by the United States left the individual states without a clear statutory remedy. The presumption that such a display of legislative
intent precluded an expansion of Sherman Act jurisdiction is not
supported by case law. 104
In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 105 upon
examining the Sherman Act, the Court said, "[l]anguage more
comprehensive is difficult to conceive. On its face it shows a careful
studied attempt to bring within the Act every person engaged in
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial
intercourse among the states. " 106 The statutory scheme is broad and
comprehensive. Exceptions to the antitrust laws are construed narrowly and should be limited unless explicitly sanctioned by Congress.107 In one such limitation, the Webb-Pomerone Act, 1011 Congress
drafted a narrow exception to the antitrust laws for export activity
which otherwise would violate the Sherman Act. 1011 However, Congress did not specifically exclude foreign nations from the Act. 110
The antitrust laws are remedial in nature and as such are broadly
construed. 111
103. 51 CONG. REC. 14519-27 (1914), cited in 316 U.S. at 161.
104. See 316 U.S. 159 (1942); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
105. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
106. Id. at 553.
107. See FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pacific
Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217-18, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966).
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976).
109. Id. § 62. The Act exempts export trade associations from the antitrust laws as long
as the associations do not substantially lessen American domestic competition. In Pfizer, the
majority and dissent used the Webb-Pomerone Act in support of their positions. Compare
434 U.S. at 314 n.12 with 434 U.S. at 323 n.l.
110. The Clayton Act includes foreign corporations within its definition of "person." 15
U.S.C. § 12 (1976). The Webb-Pomerone Act excludes foreigners in a limited fashion. Congress has never specifically addressed the rights of foreign governments. However, Congress
was conscious of them in the aforementioned acts. Through these indirect actions it does not
appear that Congress intended to hamper foreign governments' rights.
111. See Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S . 219, 2:l6
( 1948); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944); West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 1964). See
also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 66, at 14. Interpretation and enforcement of the antitrust acts
were left to the ongoing adjudication of the courts. As the litigated questions became more
novel, the courts left the common law and relied on the legislative heritage and purpose
behind the Act.
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The Pfizer Court chose a reasonable path in granting foreign
governments antitrust standing; to do otherwise would frustrate the
purpose behind the Acts. The purpose and not the literal words
should be followed. 112 In light of the Court's expansive reading of the
antitrust acts, the Pfizer decision should be liberally construed.
There are no rules of construction which demand a reading of the
antitrust acts that centers on the remedies available. The Court
found the two purposes behind section 4 of the Clayton Act to be
deterrence of violators and compensation of victims. 113 Only a broad
interpretation of the Pfizer decision would satisfy these goals fully.
Exceptions to the Clayton Act are to be strictly construed 114 since
there is no congressional mandate limiting the rights of foreign
governments to sue for treble damages. Therefore, the Pfizer opinion
should be liberally interpreted.
The canons of construction, like the legislative history, are in.:.
conclusive as to the precise meaning of "person." Stronger guidelines are found in examination of the policy behind the antitrust
statutes and the effect of international enforcement on the United
States.

D.

Policy

In Pfizer, the Court said that denial of foreign plaintiffs' standing would defeat the two purposes of the antitrust Acts. 115 Violators
would keep the "fruits of their illegality," and the foreign governments would remain uncompensated. 116 The Court believed that
business conduct outside the United States could affect economic
activity within this country .117 The reason Congress included the
treble damage remedy within the antitrust Acts was to encourage
individuals to sue, thereby increasing the deterrent effect of the
112. United States v. Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
113. 434 U.S. at 314; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 420 U.S. 477, 48586 (1977); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
114. See FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pacific
Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217-18, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966) .
115. 434 U.S. at 314.
116. Id.
117. In footnote 14, the Court stated that it is possible that denying foreign governments
the right to sue may adversely effect the American consumer by contributing to inflation,
encouraging monopoly pricing, and allowing antitrust violators to accumulate illegal profit.
This result was suggested by Velvet, Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations, 25 CATH. U.L. REV.
1, 7-8 (1975) . 434 U.S. at 315 n.14.
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law. 118 Greater deterrence affords more protection to the American
consumer.
Proscribed business conduct outside the United States has been
regulated by American antitrust statutes in the past. 1111 In United
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 120 the United States brought
an action against a domestic corporation for conspiring with foreign
corporations to restrain trade. 121 It was also held in United States
v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n 122 that the price fixing of alkalis
outside the United States constituted a Sherman Act violation. 123 In
both cases, the anticompetitive activity had the potential to adversely affect the American economy. 124 Both cases also aided in
deterring future violators by increasing antitrust prosecution. The
Pfizer Court adhered to the principle that the American market
would be further damaged by this anticompetitive activity . 125 In a
similar and related case, In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions (Kuwait
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.)' 21 a federal district court addressed the issue
of whether it was essential to allow foreign governments to sue for
treble damages to effectively enforce the antitrust laws. The court
answered the question by stating that "the fundamental goals of the
antitrust laws could be seriously frustrated by not permitting Kuwait to maintain a treble damage action for damages resulting from
the alleged conspiracy." 127 It was also noted that a successful monopoly controls both the domestic and the foreign market. 1211 In
Pfizer the pharmaceutical companies had control of both of these
markets. 129
In his dissent in Pfizer, Chief Justice Burger stated his belief
118. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Radiant Burners, Inc., v. Peoples Gas
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 655, 659-60 (1961); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
119. See generally W. FUGATE, supra note 43, at 144-72.
120. 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified & aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
121. 83 F. Supp. at 294.
122. 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
123. Id. at 66-68. But see the Webb-Pomerone Act, sections 1-6, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65
(1976), where price-fixing abroad by United States exporting companies is allowed with
government approval.
124. If the price-fixing activity were not present in the foreign market it might be possible to import the products into the United States and at least create greater competition.
125. 434 U.S. at 315 n.14.
126. 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
127. Id. at 316-17.
128. Id.
129. 434 U.S. at 310.
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that foreign nations have adequate remedies available to counter
antitrust activity without relying on American law. However, although foreign nations can enact their own antitrust statutes, 130 this
may not provide an adequate solution. Foreign governments would
have to overcome jurisdictional1 31 and political problems, 132 as well
as possible retaliatory measures by American companies. When foreign governments are forced to purchase American commodities
because they have a critical need and lack an alternative product
or market, this becomes an even more untenable solution. 133 The
respondents in Pfizer had the choice of either buying price-fixed
goods or denying their citizens medicine. Boycotting the American
pharmaceutical market was not a realistic alternative.
Chief Justice Burger would not condone granting treble damage
actions to foreign governments when they participate in the pricefixing of their own goods on the world market. 134 To affix the criterion of permitting only governments with "clean hands" the right
to sue under the antitrust Acts is not within the Court's discretion. 135
First, in allowing foreign governments to sue, an additional deterrent is added to stem antitrust activity within the United States. 136
Second, once a foreign government steps into an American court to
assert a claim, it may be subject to counterclaims. 137 Whether a
130. Id. at 315 n.14. It is interesting to note that the respondents India and the Philippines have enacted antitrust legislation. See India Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, (1969), 14 INDIA A.L.R. MANUAL 657 (1972); PHILIPPINES REV. PENAL CODE art. 186
(1972).
131. Chief Justice Burger admitted that there are jurisdictional problems; however, he
did not believe the problems were insurmountable. 434 U.S. at 327.
132. Nations that have a socialistic or communistic market structure could not, without
altering their economic philosophy, enact antitrust statutes. Antitrust statutes are designed
to foster a free market system which is based on the following assumptions: (1) a large number
of noninfluential buyers and sellers; (2) each seller's product is undifferentiated and indistinguishable from any rival seller's product; (3) there are no barriers to market entry; (4) no
artificial restraints on supply, demand, price, or mobility exist; and (5) each buyer and seller
has complete market information. J. KOCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRICES 17 (1974).
133. 434 U.S. at 318 n.18.
134. Id. at 328.
135. See Id. at 320-21. Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion, questioned the right of
the Court to decide an issue of such international consequences. The Court's decision fell
within its constitutional powers. However assessing foreign governments' morality is not. If
the Court required "clean hands" to enter into litigation, Justice Powell's dissent would
certainly be applicable.
136. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc . v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); E. TIMBERLAKE,
supra note 4.
137. See Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S . 682 (1976); The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a),(b), 1607 (1976) .
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court decides to hear those claims depends on the sovereign immunity138 and act of state doctrines. 139 If the American defendant was
directly injured 140 by the foreign nation's anticompetitive proprietary activity, 141 he could invoke the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
A narrow interpretation of the Pfizer decision would limit the
beneficial effect of deterring anticompetitive activity. It would also
hamper American courts by forcing them to decide when foreign
governments were compelled to enter the American market to obtain vital goods. Extended litigation to determine compelling need
would benefit neither the American public nor the foreign governments.
The policy behind antitrust legislation does not hinge on
whether another remedy is available. The Sherman Act supplements the common law. 142 Indeed, the drafters of the Sherman Act
believed that they were clarifying those illegal acts that were prohibited at common law. 143 Treble damage actions were included
within the Act to encourage individuals to sue, 144 and not to supply
the sole redress for victims of anticompetitive activity. Limiting
foreign governments access to the courts would be in contravention
of the broad purpose behind antitrust legislation.
IV

CONCLUSION

The underlying purpose of antitrust legislation is to protect the
American ideal of a free market economy .145 In particular, section 4
of the Clayton Act granting a treble damage remedy attempts to
deter violators and compensate victims of anticompetitive activity.
138. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605 (a),(b), 1607 (1976).
139. The act of state doctrine dictates that every sovereign respect the laws and independence of every other sovereign, and not sit in judgment of its internal acts. Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 72-74 (1977); New
York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 352-5:~. :~61
N.E.2d 963, 968-69, 393 N.Y .S.2d 312, 317-18 (1977).
140. The drug companies in Pfizer could not have sued, (for example, respondent Iran)
for fixing the price of oil because they did not directly purchase oil from Iran. The Court, in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), held that indirect purchasers cannot collect
for passed on damages caused by antitrust violations.
141. A foreign government does not have the right to exercise sovereign immunity when
acting in its proprietary capacity. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 69:~94 (1976).
142. See H. THORELLI, supra note 8, at 226-29.
143. See Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REV.
221 (1956).
144. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); E.
TIMBERLAKE, supra note 4.
145. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 1.
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The Pfizer decision arguably satisfies these goals by allowing foreign
governments to sue for antitrust violations.
The decision, however, will require further judicial refinement
in order to ascertain its full scope. A broad interpretation, allowing
foreign governments to sue without restriction, as opposed to the
narrower view, restricting standing to compelling circumstances,
will further the purposes behind the antitrust Acts. The Acts do not
require a plaintiff to come into court with "clean hands." It should
not be within the purview of the Court to decide the compelling need
of a foreign government.
Jannet L. Gurian
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